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Letter dated 14 October 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to Security Council resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), by which the Council requested me to set benchmarks for when it might be appropriate to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation to Somalia, work closely with the African Union in a joint review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and present options and recommendations to the Council by 10 October 2013.

On this basis, the United Nations and the African Union conducted a joint mission to Somalia to establish benchmarks for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and assess AMISOM. In line with my report to the Security Council of 31 January 2013 (S/2013/69) and in view of the recent deterioration of the security situation in Somalia, including the attack on the United Nations common compound on 19 June 2013 in Mogadishu, in which one United Nations staff member, three personnel of a company contracted by the United Nations and four non-United Nations security guards were killed, I also requested the joint mission to make recommendations with regard to the security of United Nations personnel.

The joint African Union-United Nations mission was conducted between 26 August and 6 September 2013. The mission, which was co-led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the African Union Peace and Security Commission, included military, police, political and logistics experts from relevant United Nations departments, the African Union Commission, AMISOM, the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), as well as some Member States and the European Union. The mission visited all four sectors of AMISOM deployment and held consultations with relevant national and international partners in Somalia, as well as in Addis Ababa and Nairobi. The findings of the joint mission are summarized in its report, which the African Union Peace and Security Council considered on 10 October 2013.

Benchmarks for a peacekeeping operation

With respect to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, I recall the advice presented in my report of 31 January 2013 (S/2013/69, para. 83). In that report, I recommended that in the current context of combat operations in Somalia, the African Union has a comparative advantage as a provider

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of military support. The option of a United Nations peacekeeping operation should be revisited as conventional combat operations against Al-Shabaab end, in consultation with the Somali authorities.

The central finding of the joint mission is that, in order to attain the minimum security conditions required to support peace consolidation in Somalia, it is essential to further degrade the capacity of the Al-Shabaab insurgency to launch asymmetric attacks. To achieve this, there must be an effective resumption of the military campaign against Al-Shabaab, which would rapidly reduce its capacity to control key strategic locations and thereby its capacity to forcefully recruit, train and finance its operations.

In parallel, it will be necessary to improve the capacity of the Somali forces to progressively sustain control of areas recaptured from Al-Shabaab, supported increasingly by the Somali national police and AMISOM formed police units. Such advances would in turn enable a safer environment for the political process in major cities. It is the responsibility of the Somali authorities, supported by UNSOM and AMISOM, to ensure the deployment of agreed local administrations to govern and provide services in newly recovered areas in a timely manner, and to coordinate military efforts with advances in political governance and service delivery.

The joint mission found that progress made towards meeting the above goals should enable a gradual reduction of the combat role of AMISOM in Somalia and allow a transition to a role of oversight and rapid response in support of the Somali national security forces. At that stage, AMISOM could be right-sized and, subject to a further decision of the Security Council, handed over to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. This sequencing should guarantee the expansion of recovery of key military strategic targets and sustenance of their control.

To enable the monitoring of progress towards these objectives, the joint mission identified a set of benchmarks that would pave the way for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the right time, as a step towards an eventual complete handover to the Somali security institutions. These are: (a) political agreement on the finalization of a federal vision and formation of administrations and states; (b) extension of State authority through local administrations in recovered areas, in line with the provisional constitution; (c) degrading Al-Shabaab to the point that it is no longer an effective force through a comprehensive strategy that includes political, economic and military components; (d) a significant improvement in the physical security situation, with a 30 to 50 per cent reduction in improvised explosive device attacks and effective control of access to key urban centres; (e) improved capability of the Somali National Army to hold the majority of major cities in south-central Somalia with a critical mass (10,000) of well-trained and well-equipped soldiers; (f) broad agreement on the major security arrangements on the role and functions of the Somali police; (g) the provision of equipment and sustainability for at least 4,000 Somali national police to contribute to peaceful elections and maintain law and order within a more permissive security environment; and (h) the consent of the Federal Government and the support of important segments of the Somali population for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

I will continue to monitor progress against these benchmarks, in consultation with the African Union, and provide the Council with updates in my regular reports.

Security situation

I am extremely concerned by the findings of the joint mission with respect to the current security situation in Somalia. The mission concluded that the political progress made over the past year and the military gains against Al-Shabaab that have been achieved in recent years are at serious risk of being reversed.

The findings of the joint mission indicate that Al-Shabaab has deliberately shifted tactics since May 2013, from conventional to asymmetrical warfare, in recovered areas, including the Somali capital. They target particularly the Government, State institutions and the international presence working in Somalia, including the United Nations.

In the face of these threats, and in the absence of enablers and force multipliers that would have permitted a sustained offensive against Al-Shabaab, the Somali National Army and AMISOM have now assumed a largely defensive, static posture. All assets currently available are required to protect existing locations and supply routes, which are increasingly vulnerable, as the lull in the offensive has allowed Al-Shabaab space to prepare more ambitious complex attacks.

In addition to causing the death of many innocent civilians, including women and children, the deterioration in the security situation threatens to undermine the fragile Somali political process, especially by preventing the Federal Government from undertaking essential tasks of outreach and State-building. Representatives of the Federal Government are at constant risk as they work to foster the political process and build State institutions. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has so far survived a number of attempts on his life.

The shift in tactics by Al-Shabaab also poses a significant challenge to the recently strengthened presence of the international community in Somalia. The attack against the United Nations common compound in Mogadishu on 19 June 2013 has seriously, though temporarily, affected the capacity of the United Nations country team to develop, deliver and monitor programmes, particularly in Mogadishu. Movement restrictions are hampering the pace at which UNSOM is able to fully deploy and support and operate alongside Somali counterparts.

In addition, these threats have implications beyond the region. The horror of the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi from 21 to 24 September 2013, for which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, is the most recent and worrisome evidence that Al-Shabaab is able to plan, rehearse and implement complex attacks threatening peace and stability in Somalia and beyond.

In the immediate term, and in order to regain momentum and avoid further reversals, there is an urgent need to resume and strengthen the military campaign against Al-Shabaab. This will require enhancement of international support to Somali National Security Forces and to AMISOM, some of which would be temporary, in order to enable the completion of offensive operations and create the space for the continuation of the political process and peacebuilding efforts. Meanwhile, additional measures are required to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel mandated by the Security Council to assist the Federal Government in delivering on a range of initiatives.

I therefore fully support the recommendations of the joint African Union-United Nations mission, as follows:

Enhancement of Somali National Army and AMISOM capacity

First, I fully support the recommendation of the joint mission on the need to provide targeted support to front line units of the Somali National Army conducting joint operations with AMISOM. Based on the force requirements, I therefore recommend that the Security Council authorize UNSOA to provide relevant Somali National Army units of up to 10,000 troops engaged in joint operations with AMISOM with a limited package of non-lethal support. This should be done in a manner similar to the support provided by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This limited support would cover mobility, food, fuel, tentage and in-theatre medical support, in order to gradually strengthen the troops' ability to hold and expand recovered areas. Resourcing this package from United Nations assessed contributions would send a clear political message that the Security Council is strongly behind Somali efforts to end the insurgency in Somalia.

Simultaneously, there is a need to urgently increase AMISOM capabilities to allow it, operating alongside Somali forces, to secure additional territory in southern Somalia and thereby deny Al-Shabaab the opportunity to raise resources and to forcefully recruit and train personnel for asymmetric attacks. In this regard, I support the recommendation of the joint mission that (a) the African Union Peace and Security Council authorize a limited increase in the current troop level of AMISOM of 17,731 uniformed personnel by the addition of three infantry battalions with a total of 2,550 troops, for a period of 18 to 24 months; and (b) that the Security Council correspondingly increase the maximum number of AMISOM personnel to whom UNSOA is authorized to provide the logistical support package referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 2093 (2013). This would allow AMISOM to jointly plan with and assist Somali forces in resuming the military campaign against Al-Shabaab and to sustain existing and newly gained territories more effectively, until the Somali National Army is able to do so independently through the ongoing bilateral support, in addition to the recommended measures outlined above.

I agree with the findings of the joint mission that it is not realistic for AMISOM to achieve the desired effect of resuming the military campaign without air assets. In particular, the force urgently requires the helicopters and other enablers that were approved by the Security Council in its resolution 2036 (2012) but that have not yet been successfully deployed to AMISOM. I call upon African and non-African Member States to come forward urgently to provide the necessary assets, for which the Security Council has already authorized support and which are planned in the United Nations logistics package support.

Additionally, specialized units are urgently required to enable AMISOM to effectively support offensive operations and secure recovered areas, including by providing in-situ training to Somali units operating alongside them. I therefore support the recommendation of the joint African Union-United Nations team that, in addition to the 20,281 troops referred to above, (a) the African Union Peace and Security Council also authorize the deployment of enabling units totalling 1,845 additional uniformed personnel to support the logistics, signal, engineers and port security units, as well as the establishment of training teams and the civilian casualties tracking, analysis and response cell; and that (b) the Security Council correspondingly increase the number of AMISOM uniformed personnel authorized

to UNSOA to provide the logistical support package referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 2093 (2013).

All support, both to the Somali national security forces and to AMISOM, would be provided in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (see A/67/775-S/2013/110). This would include conducting risk assessments, identifying and agreeing on mitigation measures and monitoring implementation, as called for under that policy, in order to ensure that the support extended will be used to build a more accountable, effective and credible Somali National Army, in compliance with international standards.

These recommendations amount to a significant, but short-term, enhancement of AMISOM and Somali military capacity. It is necessary to enhance the capacity and capabilities of forces to degrade the ability of Al-Shabaab to obtain financing and forcefully recruit and train, thereby creating the enabling security environment required for long-term political and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia, and the eventual drawdown of the international security presence. AMISOM and the Somali National Army will need to ensure greater joint operational planning to guarantee economy of effort and proper coordination of operations.

Security of United Nations personnel

The current security environment directly affects the ability of the United Nations and the international community to support the Somali authorities and people in Mogadishu and in the regions. United Nations personnel must be able to work effectively in Somalia, including to operate alongside Somali counterparts and to move freely in Mogadishu and recovered areas, in order to deliver their mandates. As indicated in my recommendations for the establishment of UNSOM (see S/2013/239), this requires additional security adjustments to allow our staff to operate safely.

In line with the report of the joint mission, I therefore recommend (a) the immediate deployment, as part of UNSOM, of a static United Nations guard unit to strengthen the security of the UNSOM compound within Mogadishu International Airport, to be provided as contingents from Member States, the details of which would be developed once a decision is taken; (b) the provision by the United Nations of the training and equipment of a dedicated force of approximately 150 elements, drawn from the Somali police, to enable the safe movement of United Nations personnel in Mogadishu and provide security to United Nations convoys until such time as the Somali Federal Government has the capability to fully undertake this task (as decided by the Federal Government, this dedicated force would also serve to make progress towards the establishment of a diplomatic police force capable of fully discharging the responsibilities of Somalia as a host country provider of security; pending the readiness of this dedicated force, the United Nations would continue to rely on the current arrangement with private contractors); and (c) quicken reaction response to security incidents by the Somali national security forces, with support from AMISOM; the relevant Somali security forces performing this quick reaction response should be supported and enhanced bilaterally.

I welcome the assurance given by the African Union that AMISOM will continue to secure the Mogadishu International Airport perimeter and provide

security for United Nations staff working outside of Mogadishu. If authorized, the proposed enhanced capacity for AMISOM is expected to free up more troops. I recommend that these troops be used for securing Mogadishu International Airport until the security situation stabilizes. As the operations of the United Nations continue to expand in accordance with mandates and needs, security provisions in the regions will need to be reassessed.

Conclusions

I wish to express my deep appreciation to the African Union Commission for the strong collaboration and partnership that characterized this important joint exercise, as well as to the Federal Government of Somalia and the members of the Security Council, the European Union and other international partners for their participation in the work of the joint team.

No tribute can adequately reflect the heroic sacrifice of the Somali forces, countries contributing troops to AMISOM and Ethiopia. Let us ensure that, collectively, we shall do our utmost to preserve and expand the gains that over more than two decades have been so hard won for the sake of peace and prosperity in Somalia.

It is difficult, at a time of global financial constraint, to ask for more resources. The international community has already invested much in Somalia, and Somalis themselves have taken extraordinary risks for peace. Together we stand on the threshold of a once-in-a-generation opportunity for peace and stability in Somalia and for stability in the region. Yet, it is my responsibility to stress to the Council that, without the additional support recommended in this letter, our joint investment is at risk of being derailed by the indefensible actions of the Al-Shabaab insurgency. I appeal to the Council to support the foregoing recommendations, which should ultimately pave the way for the exit of all international forces.

Political progress and peacebuilding require a minimum of security to flourish. At the same time, I wish to stress that the solution to the security situation in Somalia is not solely military. The achievement of military objectives must be linked to progress in the political and human rights arena. I welcome the recent steps taken by the Federal Government of Somalia in this regard, especially the launch of the Vision 2016 Conference, the establishment of the National Security Council, the formation of national structures for the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as outreach and reconciliation efforts. I emphasize that the proposed increase in military support to AMISOM and the Somali National Army should be undertaken hand-in-hand with continued progress in the reconstitution of the Somali State and the achievement of key political objectives set out under the New Deal Compact framework. In this regard, I urge all Member States to fulfil their pledges to assist Somalia in its State- and peacebuilding efforts.

Military advances should be coupled with investment in the capacity of civilian institutions to guarantee the rule of law and respect for human rights. In parallel with international support to military goals, I urge Somali political actors urgently to prioritize agreement on broad principles for the nature of policing in Somalia, in line with the Somali federal vision. I support the implementation of the immediate measures outlined by the joint mission on supporting the police in recovered areas through the Police working group. I also expect that the revision of

the AMISOM concept of operations will also identify additional measures with regard to policing, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia.

The United Nations will do its utmost to support all these aspects of the peace process in Somalia in line with the mandate given to us by this Council. At the same time, however, our collective effort in Somalia is dependent, as it has been for many years, on a rich partnership with the African Union, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development and Member States. I welcome the commitment of the African Union to quickly generate additional troops and capabilities, and recall the critical importance of predictable funding to support AMISOM. I reiterate my gratitude to the European Union for its unwavering support to AMISOM since its establishment, without which the progress we witness today could not have been achieved. I call upon Member States to redouble their efforts to share the burden of supporting the Somali National Army and AMISOM. I also reiterate the importance of providing well-coordinated bilateral and multilateral assistance and support to the Somali national security forces by Member States.

This is the moment to step up our support to Somalia, and I call on you to seize it. A modest increase in investment now will enhance security for Somalis, their neighbours and the international community now and in the long term.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2113 (2013), by which the Council requested me to continue reporting every 90 days on progress in the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The report includes an update on the situation in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 30 September 2013. It also includes, in section VIII, an assessment of progress against the benchmarks and indicators contained in my report to the Council of 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771, annex I).

II. Political developments

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

2. During the reporting period, steps taken by the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) to implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur were primarily focused on the modalities for carrying out the Darfur Development Strategy. That strategy was endorsed by participants at a donor conference held in Doha on 7 and 8 April 2013 as the framework through which to address recovery, reconstruction and development needs in Darfur.

3. On 4 August, the Darfur Regional Authority met with federal and state government officials, international development partners and UNAMID in El Fasher, Northern Darfur, to discuss implementation of the strategy. Participants noted the need to establish mechanisms to coordinate and align recovery, reconstruction and development initiatives with the priorities set out in the framework; to ensure that partners have unhindered access throughout Darfur to undertake recovery, reconstruction and development work; and to address the drivers of intercommunal fighting, the resolution of which has diverted attention and resources away from efforts to implement the strategy. The United Nations Development Programme will work with the Darfur Regional Authority to establish task forces to coordinate the implementation of projects; collect, manage and report information about their implementation to donors and partners; and publicize and promote the strategy among the Darfur population.

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4. Further, during August, a technical committee consisting of government and Darfur Regional Authority officials reviewed proposals for development projects in the areas of education, health and water and approved those in line with the Darfur Development Strategy. The proposals were developed by the Darfur Regional Authority in conjunction with local government authorities from May to July. On 31 August, the First Vice-President of the Sudan, Ali Osman Taha, announced in Khartoum the launch of a public tendering process for 1,071 projects whose total funding amounts to approximately 400 million Sudanese pounds (US$ 82.5 million). The authorities are seeking national private contractors to implement the projects. The funding is to be sourced from the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund of the Darfur Regional Authority.

5. The Darfur Coordination Board for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development, a high-level body established to coordinate donor support for the Darfur Development Strategy, held its inaugural meeting in Doha on 23 September. Participants, inter alia, adopted working procedures for the body and reviewed the mechanisms established by the Darfur Regional Authority to facilitate implementation of the strategy. Representatives of the Government of the Sudan, the Darfur Regional Authority, UNAMID, the United Nations country team and several donors attended the meeting, which was chaired by the Government of Qatar.

6. Also on 23 September, participants at the sixth meeting of the Implementation Follow-up Commission on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, held in Doha, reviewed progress against its implementation. Participants, inter alia, expressed concern about the slow pace of implementation and the adverse impact of intercommunal fighting on reconstruction and development efforts in Darfur. Government and LJM representatives announced that they had reached agreement on the results of the verification of LJM forces, conducted in March 2012, without providing further details. UNAMID continued to engage the parties to ascertain the particulars of the agreement.

7. Notwithstanding the activities noted above, progress towards the implementation of the bulk of the provisions of the Doha Document continued to lag far behind the implementation timeline, including those related to security, land ownership, rule of law and civil service reforms. While the Special Prosecutor for Darfur informed UNAMID that he had, since being appointed in June 2012, brought to trial nine cases of serious crime resulting in 42 convictions, and was investigating another 57 cases, more specific information or access to hearings was not provided.

8. Implementation of the agreement signed on 6 April 2013 between the Government of the Sudan and a faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to adopt the Doha Document continued to be delayed owing to the killing, on 12 May, of the faction's leader, Mohammed Bashar. The appointment of Bakheit Abdalla Abdel-Karim as the new leader of the faction was confirmed at an extraordinary conference held near Kutum, Northern Darfur, on 26 June. A delegation led by the faction's Deputy Chair, Al-Tom Suleiman Mohammed, travelled from Kornoi, Northern Darfur, to Khartoum on 25 August for discussions about participation in the implementation of the Doha Document. UNAMID engaged the parties to encourage them to move forward with the process.

Negotiations towards an inclusive peace agreement

9. The African Union and United Nations Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, continued with efforts to secure a comprehensive and inclusive peace agreement for Darfur. From 22 to 27 August, he held consultations with the leaders of JEM-Gibril Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Minni Minawi in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. Despite being invited, the leader of SLA-Abdul Wahid opted not to attend or to send representation in objection to his movement having been invited individually rather than collectively under the auspices of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance.

10. Participants discussed the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, the status of the peace process and the mandate of the Joint Chief Mediator. The armed movements reiterated their commitment to a negotiated settlement to the Darfur conflict and to maintaining the unity and territorial integrity of the Sudan. Further, they reiterated their call for a comprehensive approach to resolving the conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan. The Joint Chief Mediator urged the movements to enter into negotiations with the Government over a political settlement to the Darfur conflict and to work with partners to facilitate recovery and development. Participants agreed to meet again within 60 days to further discuss the movements' participation in the peace process. Representatives of the African Union, Canada, the European Union, France, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Norway, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America observed the consultations.

11. The Joint Chief Mediator met from 28 August to 2 September with various officials of the Government of the Sudan in Khartoum. The officials welcomed his engagement with the non-signatory armed movements, reiterated that any dialogue between the Government and the movements should be based on the Doha Document and expressed willingness to accommodate the movements' participation in a national constitutional dialogue process. On 3 September, the Joint Chief Mediator met with the Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar, Ahmad Bin Abdullah Al Mahmoud, who reaffirmed the support of his Government for the Darfur peace process.

Darfur-based dialogue

12. With regard to the Darfur-based dialogue and consultations provided for in the Doha Document, UNAMID, in conjunction with the African Union Commission and the Government of Qatar, continued to develop a concept note and communications strategy for the initiative. It is envisaged to hold a series of conferences throughout Darfur over a seven-month period. An implementation committee comprising representatives of the signatory parties and civil society will oversee the process, including the selection of participants, and the exercise will be inclusive and locally owned. Participants at the sixth meeting of the Implementation Follow-up Commission agreed that UNAMID, LJM and the Government would meet at the technical level in October to review the plan and develop a timetable for implementation.

III. Protection of civilians from physical violence

13. During the reporting period, heavy intercommunal fighting over land and other natural resources, as well as sporadic fighting between the Government and armed movements, continued to present a serious risk of physical violence to civilians.

14. Sporadic fighting between Government and armed movement forces continued, in particular in Beliel (Southern Darfur) and Dar El Salam and Tawilla localities (Northern Darfur), albeit at a reduced rate during the rainy-season months of July and August. On 3 and 9 July, Government and SLA-Minni Minawi forces clashed near Um Goniya and Marta (32 km south-east and 50 km south-east of Nyala, Southern Darfur, respectively). Reportedly, two movement fighters were injured; the authorities declined to provide information about casualties among Government forces. Access restrictions imposed by the authorities prevented a timely assessment of the impact on the civilian population. On 21 and 31 July, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft conducted aerial strikes against suspected SLA-Minni Minawi forces in the Arafa Mountains (25 km west of Shangil Tobaya, Northern Darfur). In the early hours of 31 July, UNAMID observed an armed opposition movement convoy of 55 gun-mounted off-road vehicles near Khor Abeche (Southern Darfur) moving towards the mountains.

15. On 14 August, the Sudanese Armed Forces conducted aerial strikes near Dobo and Tarny (65 km south-west of El Fasher, Northern Darfur) following, according to Government security officials, sightings of suspected SLA-Minni Minawi forces. On 26 July, the parties clashed near Shurung (40 km south-east of Nyala, Southern Darfur). There were no reported civilian casualties. On 14 September, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropped a bomb near Nemeira (15 km west of Shangil Tobaya, Northern Darfur), injuring a farmer to whom UNAMID provided medical assistance.

16. Fighting between communities continued to be a significant source of insecurity for the civilian population. On 29 July, a business dispute triggered clashes between groups of Fur and Northern Rezeigat in Kabkabiya (140 km west of El Fasher, Northern Darfur). A total of nine people, including two women, were killed. On 6 August, negotiations facilitated by traditional community leaders and UNAMID resulted in the parties signing a peaceful coexistence agreement in Kabkabiya, according to which they agreed to cease hostilities and pay compensation for casualties resulting from the clashes. There were no further reports of fighting between the groups.

17. Cattle rustling triggered heavy fighting on 8 August between groups of Southern Rezeigat and Ma'alia in and around Abu Karinka (50 km north-east of El Daein, Eastern Darfur). The conflict escalated and spread, between 9 and 22 August, to Adilla and Kelikeli (85 km east and 20 km north-west of El Daein, respectively). Reportedly, an estimated 500 to 600 fighters were killed in the clashes, which were fuelled by a long-running land dispute. Government authorities estimated that the fighting displaced approximately 144,000 people. In addition, the marketplace in El Daein was closed for several days, shops were looted and houses in rural areas were destroyed.

18. UNAMID immediately provided technical and logistical support to local community leaders, Government authorities and Darfur Regional Authority officials working to resolve the dispute. Progress in those efforts was threatened when, on 17 August, Rezeigat assailants abducted 24 of a group of 300 Ma'alia civilians

travelling under Government security escort from El Daein to safety in Abu Karinka (50 km east of El Daein). The following day, in collaboration with the authorities, UNAMID evacuated 126 of the 300 Ma'alia civilians by air from El Daein to Abu Karinka, Nyala and Khartoum, while the Government transported the remainder. On 22 August, one day following the negotiated release of the 24 abductees, the parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in Al Tawaisha, Northern Darfur. In addition to providing support for the negotiations, UNAMID facilitated the delivery by humanitarian actors of aid to affected communities in El Daein and secured aid agencies' assets at its base.

19. Minor clashes between the groups subsequently took place in Kalaju and Dar El Salam (75 km north-west and 35 km east of El Daein, respectively) on 25 and 26 August, resulting in the death of one Reizegat and two Ma'alia fighters. On 18 September, a case of livestock theft triggered renewed fighting between the groups in Bakhit (80 km east of El Daein). According to Government security authorities, 21 fighters were killed (13 Southern Rezeigat and 8 Ma'alia) and 53 were wounded (25 Southern Rezeigat and 28 Ma'alia). Government officials deployed the Sudanese Armed Forces between the parties and, along with community leaders, proceeded to the area to mediate. No further clashes were recorded.

20. Negotiations between the Salamat and Misseriya tribes, who had fought over land and local political appointments in Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, early in April (see S/2013/420, paras. 19-23), concluded with the signing of a reconciliation agreement in Zalingei, Central Darfur, on 3 July. The parties agreed to cease hostilities, facilitate the return of people displaced by the clashes and pay compensation for casualties of the fighting. UNAMID provided technical and logistical support for the negotiations, which were brokered by Government authorities, Darfur Regional Authority officials and traditional community leaders.

21. On 22 July, however, the fatal shooting of a Salamat member of the Central Reserve Police by a Misseriya man in Garsila (84 km south of Zalengei, Central Darfur) triggered renewed fighting between the groups. That fighting escalated and spread to Muradaf and Wadi Salih (180 km south-south-west and 85 km south-east of Zalengei, Central Darfur, respectively) between 23 and 30 July. Reportedly, an estimated 150 fighters were killed. Local and State authorities deployed additional Government troops and police to defuse tensions and intervened through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Humanitarian actors, supported by UNAMID, provided aid to 22,943 people displaced by the clashes. The reconciliation effort led to the parties signing a cessation of hostilities agreement in Garsila on 31 July, in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the 3 July accord. That agreement was also broken, however, when the groups clashed in Dembow Kabdy, Kubkie and Muraya (18 km east, 34 km south-west and 40 km south of Mukhjar, Central Darfur, respectively) between 20 and 27 September, resulting in at least 45 fatalities (15 Misseriya and 30 Salamat).

22. Efforts continued to restore peaceful relations between the Aballa and Beni Hussein, who had engaged in heavy fighting over control of an artisanal gold mine and surrounding land in Jebel Amir (40 km north-west of Kabkabiya, Northern Darfur) in January (see S/2013/420, paras. 25-28). On 27 July, a four-day peace conference in El Fasher sponsored by the Governor of Northern Darfur, Osman Mohamed Yousif Kibir, concluded with community leaders of the parties signing a

peace and reconciliation agreement in which they committed themselves to ceasing hostilities, facilitating returns and directing a portion of the revenues generated by the gold mine to compensate casualties of the fighting and rehabilitate the affected area. Several key Abalia commanders, however, did not participate in the conference. On 24 July, Musa Hilal, a prominent Abalia leader and envoy for tribal affairs appointed by the President of the Sudan, Omer Al-Bashir, initiated a parallel reconciliation initiative in Saraf Umra, Northern Darfur. That process led to the signing on 10 September of a separate reconciliation agreement between different representatives of the parties who agreed to cease hostilities, remove roadblocks from the affected area and refer the dispute over control of the gold mine to the federal Government. There were no major outbreaks of fighting between the groups during the reporting period.

23. There were a number of significant incidents of violence and unrest in Nyala, Southern Darfur, and Zam Zam camp, Northern Darfur. The killing of a Central Reserve Police commander by National Intelligence and Security Service forces in Nyala on 3 July set off four days of fighting in the city. The commander was killed during an attempt by his soldiers to free him from National Intelligence and Security Services custody, where he was being held in connection with a carjacking. The following day, Central Reserve Police attacked the Intelligence Service compound. Grenades thrown into the adjacent World Vision International premises during that attack killed two national staff and seriously injured another. Three local civilians were killed and five were seriously injured in the crossfire. Amid heavy fighting, UNAMID evacuated 130 mission and humanitarian personnel to its base on the outskirts of the city. In addition, the mission secured aid agencies' assets, including 39 vehicles. Fighting continued from 5 to 7 July until senior Government officials intervened to stabilize the situation.

24. Unrest again broke out in Nyala on 19 September, the day following the fatal shooting of a prominent businessman by unidentified assailants. Approximately 3,000 mourners paraded through the city and, upon reaching the Governor's office, vandalized Government buildings and vehicles. Government police fired tear gas and warning shots to disperse the crowd. Reportedly, three civilians were killed and five were injured. On 22 September, while leading a Government delegation to the city, Second Vice-President Al Haj Adam Youssef called for calm and announced that State authorities would swiftly investigate the killing. On 24 and 25 September, several hundred people took to the streets in Nyala and El Fasher to protest the removal by the Government of subsidies on fuel and other commodities. Government police were deployed to contain the protests. There were no casualties reported.

25. On 11 September, following the alleged rape on 7 September of a woman from Zam Zam camp, Northern Darfur, by a Central Reserve Police officer, Sudan Revolutionary Front forces attacked a Sudan Armed Forces checkpoint at Um Hashaba (25 km west of El Fasher). One Government soldier was killed and seven were wounded. In addition, a local bystander was killed in the crossfire. Later the same day, five internally displaced persons were injured during a confrontation between camp residents and Central Reserve Police at Zam Zam camp. UNAMID evacuated the casualties to El Fasher for medical treatment. The situation in and around the camp remained tense.

26. During the period under review, UNAMID recorded a total of five carjacking incidents, 75 armed robberies and 10 abductions in which the local civilian population was targeted (as compared to 4 carjacking incidents, 88 armed robberies and 21 abductions in the previous period).

IV. Security situation and freedom of movement

27. Between 1 July and 29 September, the mission's movements over land were restricted on 37 occasions, compared with 38 in the previous reporting period. Following the 11 September confrontation between the Central Reserve Police and internally displaced persons at Zam Zam camp (see para. 25 above), Government security authorities prevented UNAMID and humanitarian personnel from accessing that and the nearby Abu Shouk camp until 27 September. The mission undertook several démarches to Government and police officials in that regard. Regarding movements by air, Government authorities denied 826 of 4,734 flight requests, as compared to 141 of 5,435 requests in the previous period. UNAMID urged the authorities on several occasions, including at the tripartite coordination mechanism meetings held on 17 and 28 September, to allow the mission unhindered freedom of movement throughout Darfur. Government representatives stated that restrictions of movement were occasionally imposed on the mission for safety reasons.

28. Humanitarian personnel continued to experience access denials that constrained the delivery of aid, in particular in Eastern Darfur following the outbreak of intercommunal fighting and in Jebel Marra, Central Darfur. Restrictions of movement imposed by the authorities and parties to the conflict from 8 August until at least the end of the reporting period delayed the conduct of a needs assessment and the delivery of aid to civilians in Eastern Darfur beyond El Daein and Muhajeria towns. Access for agencies to an estimated 100,000 people either displaced or severely affected by conflict in the Jebel Marra area remained restricted.

Safety and security

29. Threats to the safety and security of UNAMID and humanitarian personnel in Darfur remained of serious concern. UNAMID peacekeepers came under armed attack on seven occasions.

30. On 3 July, approximately 70 unidentified armed assailants ambushed a UNAMID patrol made up of 41 peacekeepers near Um Zeifa (50 km west of Labado, Eastern Darfur), seriously wounding three members of the patrol. The attackers fled the scene upon the arrival of UNAMID reinforcements. One of the perpetrators was killed in the exchange of fire. While UNAMID called on the authorities to assist in an investigation, they are yet to do so and the affiliation of the attackers is yet to be established.

31. Ten days later, on 13 July, approximately 120 unidentified armed assailants ambushed a UNAMID convoy consisting of 36 peacekeepers 25 km west of Khor Abeche, Southern Darfur, killing seven peacekeepers from the United Republic of Tanzania and one police adviser from Sierra Leone. A total of 15 others, including two police advisers, were injured. The engagement ended after UNAMID reinforcements reached the scene. On 8 September, the Special Prosecutor informed

UNAMID that he had initiated an investigation into the attack. A high-level United Nations investigation is under way.

32. Against a backdrop of intercommunal fighting in and around El Daein, on 12 August, unidentified armed assailants aboard two gun-mounted vehicles stopped and surrounded a UNAMID patrol made up of 15 formed police unit personnel in the town centre. While the patrol was able to depart the scene and return safely to base, the assailants made away with a vehicle and military equipment. There were no casualties.

33. A series of three attacks in as many days followed. On 25 August, approximately 15 unidentified armed assailants attacked a UNAMID patrol made up of 28 peacekeepers deployed to secure mission vehicles immobilized by poor road conditions 13 km south-west of Graida, Southern Darfur. Two peacekeepers were seriously injured in the exchange of fire. The following day, 40 to 50 unidentified assailants attacked a UNAMID logistics patrol consisting of 41 peacekeepers in Al Mimjer (36 km north-west of El Daein, Eastern Darfur). Three peacekeepers sustained serious injuries during the exchange of fire. On 27 August, three unidentified armed men fired at UNAMID peacekeepers near Nyoro (30 km south-west of El Geneina, Western Darfur) during a search for missing peacekeepers caught in a flash flood two days prior. The peacekeepers repelled the attackers by returning fire. There were no casualties. The missing peacekeepers were among a group of six caught in a flash flood while escorting a humanitarian convoy across a river at Nyoro on 25 August. While two of the peacekeepers were recovered alive, four others from Burkina Faso were found to have perished.

34. On 1 September, between 15 and 20 unidentified armed men fired on a UNAMID logistics patrol made up of 47 peacekeepers 10 km south-west of Shaeria, Eastern Darfur. The patrol returned fire. There were no casualties.

35. On 26 August, unidentified armed assailants abducted eight national staff members of the International Committee for the Red Cross travelling in an aid convoy near Hila Beeda (35 km north-east of Zalingei, Central Darfur). They also stole two trucks. The following day, six of the staff members were released near Nertiti, Central Darfur. On 8 September, the remaining two were released in Jebel Marra, Central Darfur.

36. On 8 September, Government police detained three UNAMID national staff in Nyala in connection with the alleged defamation of a police officer in December 2012. The staff members were released without charge the following day. UNAMID lodged a protest with the authorities over the matter.

37. A total of 12 carjackings targeting vehicles of UNAMID and humanitarian actors occurred during the reporting period (compared to 9 in the previous period). A total of 16 incidents involving house break-ins and robberies targeting UNAMID and humanitarian personnel were recorded (12 in the previous period).

38. On 3 August, a helicopter used by a rations provider contracted by UNAMID and its three crew members were detained by SLA-Minni Minawi forces after having made an emergency landing 50 km south of Nyala owing to technical difficulties. Negotiations between the company and armed movement led to the release of the crew on 27 August. As at 30 September, negotiations between the company and the movement over the release of the helicopter were ongoing.

39. Unidentified armed men kidnapped an international commercial contractor working on a road construction project near Krindig (3 km south-east of El Geneina, Western Darfur) on 21 September. As at 30 September, efforts by Government authorities to secure his release continued.

40. On 29 September, a UNAMID-contracted helicopter made an emergency landing in Zalingei, Central Darfur, after developing a technical fault shortly after take-off. The helicopter was heavily damaged and three passengers suffered minor injuries upon landing.

V. Humanitarian situation

41. During the reporting period, the need for humanitarian assistance increased significantly in and around areas affected by intercommunal fighting. Altogether, an estimated 166,600 people were newly displaced.

42. According to the authorities, approximately 140,100 people were displaced by intercommunal clashes in Eastern Darfur. They fled to various locations including Adilla, Abu Karinka and El Daein. The same fighting displaced 3,615 people to Al Liat, Northern Darfur. Access restrictions and insecurity prevented humanitarian agencies from verifying the number of newly displaced. Aid agencies provided assistance to 21,910 people displaced by intercommunal fighting in Central Darfur to areas including Um Dukhun, Zalengei, Bindisi, Mukhjar and Wadi Salih. The same clashes displaced 1,033 people to Kubum (130 km west of Nyala, Southern Darfur). The aid included emergency shelter, food, health-care and sanitation facilities.

43. Heavy seasonal rainfall and flooding caused extensive damage to housing throughout Darfur, in particular in Tawilla, Malha and Kuma localities in Northern Darfur. According to Government estimates, 11,239 households were significantly affected (5,827 in Northern Darfur, 3,688 in Southern Darfur, 192 in Western Darfur, and 1,532 in Central Darfur). Humanitarian agencies provided food, emergency shelter, health care, water and sanitation facilities. UNAMID provided logistical assistance and security escorts to the aid effort.

44. Humanitarian actors continued to provide relief to the estimated 3.2 million people targeted for humanitarian assistance in Darfur. This included 1.2 million long-term internally displaced persons in camps verified by the World Food Programme (with biometrics) for food assistance; over 240,000 registered new arrivals to camps in 2013; other internally displaced persons (either living in camps but unregistered or living outside camps); and other vulnerable people in Darfur. The main areas of assistance were food security and livelihoods, education, health care, water and sanitation.

45. Bureaucratic impediments by the authorities continued to adversely affect aid agencies' operations. As at 6 August, 20 of the 38 international staff members of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees assigned to work in Darfur were unable to access the region owing to delays by the authorities in renewing their travel permits. The staff members were temporarily reassigned elsewhere or dispatched on leave until the matter could be resolved. Discussions between the agency and the authorities led early in September to the renewal of permits until the end of the year. By 18 September, access had been restored for all

38 Darfur-based staff. The authorities cited the need for the agency to clarify the nature of its work with internally displaced persons.

VI. Rule of law, governance and human rights

46. The overall number of human rights violations recorded by UNAMID decreased from 126 incidents involving 557 victims in the previous reporting period to 87 incidents involving 189 victims between 1 July and 27 September (29 victims of violations of the right to life, 113 victims of violations of the right to physical integrity, 31 victims of sexual and gender-based violence and 16 victims of detention without charge). Access constraints related to the security situation, impassable roads and restrictions imposed by the authorities adversely affected the ability of UNAMID to conduct timely site visits to a number of locations of reported human rights violations. In those cases, UNAMID was limited to conducting enquiries by telephone or, where telephone coverage was absent, with local interlocutors who could reach team sites.

47. During the reporting period, UNAMID recorded 17 cases of violations of the right to life involving 29 civilian victims, compared with 44 incidents involving 283 civilian victims in the previous reporting period. A lack of access to areas affected by military clashes or intercommunal fighting contributed to the decrease in recorded cases. Of the 17 incidents, 8 cases involving 11 victims were perpetrated against civilians by Government soldiers, Border Guard personnel or Central Reserve Police, and 9 cases involving 18 victims were perpetrated against civilians, in particular internally displaced persons, by unidentified armed men.

48. There were 42 incidents of documented violations of the right to physical integrity, including abductions, armed attacks and physical assaults, involving 113 civilian victims. This was a decrease from 50 incidents involving 236 victims in the previous reporting period. Twelve cases, involving 40 victims, were violations allegedly perpetrated by members of the Central Reserve Police, Border Guards, Sudanese Armed Forces or SLA-Minni Minawi. The remaining 30 incidents, involving 73 victims, were allegedly perpetrated by militia or unidentified armed men against civilians engaged in livelihood activities.

49. UNAMID recorded 24 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence involving 31 victims, compared with 26 incidents involving 30 victims in the previous period. A total of 17 cases involving 23 victims, 4 of whom were minors, were incidents of rape. One of the adult victims was a deaf 25-year-old woman who, on 10 August, was allegedly raped by three unidentified men while returning home from farming. All of the attacks occurred while the victims were farming, collecting firewood or cutting grass. While 15 of the 17 incidents were reported to the Government police, only three arrests in connection with one case were made. The police cited difficulties in identifying the perpetrators in the other cases. Underreporting of sexual and gender-based violence remained a challenge owing to social stigma and the lack of confidence in Government authorities to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes.

50. UNAMID recorded 4 incidents of detention without charge involving 16 victims, as compared to 7 incidents involving 8 victims in the previous reporting period. In one incident, Government security authorities reportedly arrested and detained 12 youths for disrupting the work of oil field staff at the Zarqa Hadida oil

field (35 km east of El Daein, Eastern Darfur), on 27 July. The youths were among a group who staged a peaceful demonstration over their lack of access to employment opportunities in the oil industry. As at 30 September, UNAMID remained unable, owing to insecurity and impassable roads, to ascertain the status of the detainees or their conditions of detention. On 1 July, a man detained in Nyala, Southern Darfur, for nine months and allegedly tortured by the National Intelligence and Security Service for sympathizing with the armed opposition was released after a family member persuaded the authorities in Khartoum of his innocence. Fear of reprisal has contributed to the underreporting of such incidents by victims.

51. Accountability for human rights violations in Darfur remained a challenge. Of the 87 cases recorded by UNAMID, 55 incidents involving 113 victims were reported by the victims to Government police. Investigations were initiated into 11 of those incidents, involving 37 victims. As at 30 September, police had made arrests in connection with six cases. In two other cases, members of the community apprehended and handed over the alleged perpetrators to the police. In addition to investigating and reporting violations, UNAMID continued to undertake capacity-building and advocacy with Government, civil society and armed group representatives. This included the holding of a workshop on human rights laws for 25 LJM officials in Malha, Northern Darfur, from 29 to 31 July.

52. In an effort to help strengthen the judicial and corrections systems, UNAMID conducted training in prison records management and the handling of offenders for prison officers at Zalingei Prison, Central Darfur, on 7 August. In addition, UNAMID conducted workshops on human rights and basic prison duties for 120 newly recruited prison officers in El Fasher, Northern Darfur, from 10 to 20 July. To increase access to justice in remote areas, UNAMID transported judges and their staff to Um Kadada and Kabkabiya, Northern Darfur, on 3 and 12 September, respectively, to review serious criminal cases in locations where such capacity is not permanently present.

53. UNAMID continued to promote gender mainstreaming and gender equality. From 7 to 9 July, the mission conducted a seminar on advocacy skills for 42 women legislators in El Geneina, Western Darfur, to enhance their ability to participate in government and revise laws that discriminate against women. In addition, on 24 July, UNAMID delivered training on gender issues to 27 officials from the Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission in Nyala, Southern Darfur.

Child protection

54. Following discussions with UNAMID, Musa Hilal, in his capacity as a leader of the Northern Rezeigat tribe, issued a command Order to all militias and nomadic community members under his leadership on 26 July prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Further, he pledged adherence to national laws protecting children and to international legal standards protecting children in situations of armed conflict.

VII. Mission deployment and operations

55. As at 28 September 2013, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 2,930 national staff, 1,027 international staff and 414 United Nations Volunteers, representing 83 per cent of the approved strength of 5,277.

56. UNAMID military personnel numbered 14,801 (14,125 troops, 330 staff officers, 256 military observers and 90 liaison officers), representing 91 per cent of the authorized strength of 16,200. A pledge to deploy an additional infantry battalion and a military utility helicopter unit, which would bring the military component to its full authorized strength, has been received.

57. The number of UNAMID individual police officers stood at 2,120, of whom 82 per cent were men and 18 per cent women. They included 627 officers whose tours of duty had been extended beyond the normal period to account for delays in the issuance of visas for incoming police personnel. The 17 authorized formed police units are fully deployed.

58. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel conducted 11,043 patrols, including 6,338 routine patrols, 2,171 night patrols, 851 humanitarian escorts, 838 administrative patrols, 578 short-range patrols and 267 long-range patrols. UNAMID police personnel conducted a total of 16,887 patrols, including 12,334 inside camps for internally displaced persons, 3,206 in villages, towns and markets, 1,021 medium-range patrols, 133 firewood and farm patrols and 193 long-range patrols.

59. From 1 July to 30 September 2013, the Sudanese authorities issued 825 new entry visas for UNAMID personnel. As at 30 September, 386 visas were pending, 279 of which were for civilian police officers, 96 for civilians and 11 for military personnel. These figures exclude 230 requests outstanding since 2011, which UNAMID is reviewing to ascertain their continued relevance.

60. UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan held a technical-level meeting of the tripartite coordination mechanism in Khartoum on 17 September. Participants discussed, among other things, outstanding visa requests and the allocation of land for UNAMID to drill water boreholes. Participants representing the Government requested UNAMID to henceforth disregard the visa requests outstanding since 2011 and 2012, as the mission had functioned thus far without the personnel. Further, the representatives agreed to designate land for the drilling of additional boreholes. Regarding visas, UNAMID reiterated its commitment to jointly reviewing with the Government all requests outstanding since 2011 and 2012 to determine which are no longer required.

61. On 28 September, the sixteenth tripartite coordination mechanism meeting between the Government of the Sudan, the African Union and the United Nations was held in New York. Participants agreed that the Darfur Development Strategy was a solid framework for addressing the root causes of the conflict and expressed concern about insecurity in parts of Darfur. Representatives of the African Union and the United Nations underscored the importance of unfettered freedom of movement for UNAMID and urged the Government of the Sudan to facilitate the timely issuance of visas to mission personnel.

62. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2113 (2013), implementation of the recommendations of the review of UNAMID uniformed

personnel continued. Joint operations centres were established at each team site to improve information management and coordination at the tactical level between troops, police and civilian units. The repatriation of the last military unit designated for withdrawal, a light field engineering unit, is scheduled for December 2013. Reductions in the mission's overall troop and police strengths are on track for completion by 31 January 2014.

63. Regarding the operational and self-sustainment capabilities of troop and police contingents, of the 44 military and police units currently deployed to UNAMID, 17 have achieved a major equipment serviceability rate above the 90 per cent threshold. This is an increase from 11 units in the previous period, thanks mainly to the servicing of vehicles by contingents whose compliance level was slightly below the 90 per cent threshold. However, the serviceability rate of seven units remains below 48 per cent. The shortfalls pertain mainly to the serviceability of armoured personnel carriers. The Secretariat continued to engage with troop- and police-contributing countries to encourage them to swiftly address the shortfalls.

64. In line with paragraph 23 of General Assembly resolution 66/264, the Secretariat, in consultation with the African Union Commission and UNAMID, undertook a review of the mission's civilian staffing requirements, including through an assessment mission to Darfur from 19 to 24 August. Its purpose was to ensure that the staffing composition is appropriate to effectively implement the current mission mandate and meet the mission's medium-term objectives, strategies and priorities. The findings and recommendations will be incorporated into the detailed and forward-looking review of UNAMID requested by the Security Council in resolution 2113 (2013). The comprehensive analysis of the situation in Darfur upon which that review will be based is under way.

65. During the reporting period, a total of 13 quick-impact projects were completed; 53 additional project proposals were approved for implementation. As at 30 September, a total of 78 projects were ongoing and at various stages of completion. The completed projects included the construction of a prison block and four courthouses in rural towns.

66. UNAMID, in collaboration with local partners, continued to implement community-based labour-intensive projects for youth assessed as at risk of joining armed groups or gangs. The implementation of five projects, including on-the-job training through the construction of a community health centre and four schools, was completed in August and September. A total of 13 additional projects involving livelihood activities and on-the-job training in the construction of community infrastructure are ongoing.

67. UNAMID, in conjunction with the United Nations Mine Action Service, continued to reduce the threat posed to civilians by explosive remnants of war. During the reporting period, 452 km of road were assessed; 265 km suspected of having been recontaminated owing to outbreaks of fighting were reassessed; and general mine action assessments were conducted in 16 villages covering a total of 33 km^2. Approximately 83 explosive remnants of war and 2,312 rounds of small-arms ammunition were located and safely destroyed. UNAMID also delivered unexploded ordnance risk education to 4,620 civilians, of whom 2,763 were women or girls.

VIII. Progress against benchmarks

68. The present section gives an assessment of the progress made by UNAMID against the benchmarks and indicators set out in my report of 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771, annex I).

69. Progress against the first benchmark, which pertains to the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the Darfur conflict, was limited during the period under review. The holding of consultations by the Joint Chief Mediator with the leaders of two of the three major non-signatory movements, SLA-Minni Minawi and JEM-Gibril Ibrahim, and his subsequent engagement with the Government of the Sudan were encouraging. Nonetheless, military hostilities between Government and armed movement forces and intercommunal fighting continued. Efforts by the Darfur Regional Authority and the Government, supported by the United Nations country team, to implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur were focused mainly on initiating the implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy. The construction of projects on the ground, however, is yet to begin. Progress against most of the other provisions of the agreement, in particular those related to security, rule of law and land reform, remained limited and continued to lag far behind the implementation timelines.

70. The second benchmark relates to the restoration of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. The bouts of heavy intercommunal fighting in Central and Eastern Darfur hindered progress in this area. While Government and community reconciliation efforts, supported by UNAMID, led to agreements between the parties that helped, in most cases, to ease tensions, the overall security situation remained volatile. Although incidents of clashes between Government and armed movement forces declined during the reporting period, as compared to the previous three months, the reduction was attributed mainly to the onset of the rainy season. The numerous armed attacks and other security incidents targeting UNAMID peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel highlighted the very challenging security environment in which they conducted operations.

71. The third benchmark relates to strengthening the rule of law, governance and the protection of human rights. There was no improvement in the human rights situation in Darfur during the period under review. The reduction in the number of recorded cases was consistent with previous trends, when the rainy season reduced access for the investigation of alleged violations. There was no recorded improvement in the level of accountability for human rights violations. UNAMID continued to work with Government police, corrections and judicial authorities, however, on capacity-building and advocacy to strengthen the rule of law, governance and respect for human rights.

72. The fourth benchmark concerns stabilizing the humanitarian situation and facilitating the delivery of aid and the initiation of early recovery activities. The outbreaks of heavy intercommunal fighting significantly increased the need for humanitarian aid, in particular among people displaced by the fighting in Central and Eastern Darfur. Insecurity and the access restrictions initially imposed by the authorities and parties to the conflict following the outbreaks of fighting hindered the delivery of assistance outside of El Daein in Eastern Darfur. In addition, the fighting undermined early recovery efforts by constraining access and diverting the attention and resources of the Government, the Darfur Regional Authority and

international partners away from such activities. Bureaucratic impediments adversely affected aid agencies' ability to undertake protection activities. While the substantial humanitarian operation in Darfur continued, there was little if any progress against this benchmark.

IX. Financial aspects

73. The General Assembly, by its resolution 67/284, appropriated the amount of $1,335.2 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014.

74. As at 1 October 2013, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNAMID amounted to $590.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to $3,610.5 million.

75. As at 1 October 2013, reimbursement to contributing Governments for troop and formed police costs and for contingent-owned equipment costs had been made for the period up to 31 August 2013 and 30 June 2013, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

X. Observations

76. Two years since the adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur by the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement, the parties' main focus has shifted from establishing the institutions provided for in the agreement to kick-starting implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy. That strategy was formulated by the Darfur Regional Authority, the Government of the Sudan and development agencies, from May 2012 to March 2013, as the framework for addressing the recovery, reconstruction and development needs of Darfur. The steps taken so far by the parties towards its implementation have mainly involved preparing project proposals, setting up coordination mechanisms and engaging implementation partners.

77. Efforts by the signatory parties, supported by international partners, to promote recovery, reconstruction and development in Darfur are very welcome. Concrete measures taken on the ground to reconstruct and rehabilitate the region are urgently needed to address the root causes of conflict, promote stability and generate much-needed support for the peace process. I therefore urge the parties to progress from planning and coordination to the actual implementation of projects and programmes as soon as possible, including by making the needed resources available and facilitating the work of regional and international agencies. I also encourage donors to follow through on the pledges made at the donor conference held in Doha on 7 and 8 April 2013.

78. Just as implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy is much needed to help mitigate conflict and promote stability, so too is implementation of the other aspects of the Doha Document, including those related to security, rule of law and land ownership. To date, progress in these areas, considered in terms of impact on the ground, has been limited despite the establishment of the various commissions and mechanisms provided for in the Doha Document. I call upon the parties to step up implementation of all outstanding provisions of the Doha Document by

demonstrating greater political will and increasing their commitment of resources, alongside which the international community can lend its full support.

79. Regarding the inclusiveness of the Doha Document, I welcome the continued commitment of the signatory faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to the agreement, despite the killing of its erstwhile leader, Mohammed Bashar. I urge the new leadership and the Government to quickly conclude arrangements for the faction's participation in its implementation.

80. Progress on each of these fronts requires an enabling environment in which the implementation of early recovery, rehabilitation, development and other aspects of the Doha Document can be carried out effectively, safely and sustainably. Achieving this entails, among other things, addressing the grave insecurity affecting several parts of Darfur, the predominant source of which is currently intercommunal fighting. Such fighting has constrained access, led to the destruction of property and diverted resources and attention away from recovery, reconstruction and development. The clashes have tended to be triggered by minor incidents and altercations. However, they have been exacerbated and fuelled by underlying disputes over access to land and other natural resources, as well as a lack of access to effective dispute resolution mechanisms. Their intensity and dire impact on the civilian population, which has included the displacement of 166,000 people in the past three months, have been heightened by the prevalence of arms and the participation of militias fighting in support of their tribal affiliates.

81. The steps taken by government officials, traditional community leaders and the Darfur Regional Authority to resolve the fighting through dialogue and mediation have been encouraging. Furthermore, the cooperation between the authorities, community leaders and UNAMID in this regard has been mutually beneficial and should be continued and enhanced. For the resultant peace and reconciliation agreements to be effective, however, they will need to be fully implemented by the parties and supported by measures that address the underlying causes of violence. I urge Government authorities to pursue the latter through measures that strengthen the rule of law, enable equitable access to land and other natural resources and advance civilian arms control and the disarmament and disbandment of militias. The Doha Document provides a framework for these measures.

82. Several of the militias that operate in Darfur were formed to augment the State's ability to counter the armed opposition movements. They are still active in Darfur and continue to clash with Government forces and the militias, with adverse consequences for the civilian population. A negotiated political settlement that includes all armed groups, including the non-signatory armed movements, remains a key element of a comprehensive solution to the conflict. I am encouraged by the consultations held by the Joint Chief Mediator, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, with the leaders of SLA-Minni Minawi and JEM-Gibril Ibrahim in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. This was an important step in the process of revitalizing efforts to reach an inclusive political settlement. I urge the Government and the armed movements to remain open to and flexible regarding their conditions for engaging in talks. I also call upon the leader of SLA-Abdul Wahid to participate in the mediation process without preconditions or further delay.

83. In the absence of progress in the peace process and in light of the continued fighting, UNAMID continues to make important contributions to the protection of civilians, safe and timely delivery of humanitarian aid and local conflict resolution.

Among other assistance provided, UNAMID evacuated wounded civilians to medical facilities, moved vulnerable groups to safety, secured aid convoys and transported traditional mediators to hot spots in a bid to ease tensions. However, the mission continued to contend with several challenges to its operations, including access restrictions and bureaucratic impediments that at times constrained its ability to provide assistance. I call upon the parties to the conflict to allow UNAMID and humanitarian actors unhindered freedom of movement throughout Darfur and upon the authorities to facilitate the work of mission and humanitarian personnel through, inter alia, the timely issuance of visas and travel permits.

84. The safety and security environment in which UNAMID and humanitarian personnel operate in Darfur remains very troubling. I condemn in the strongest terms those responsible for the armed attacks on UNAMID patrols, in particular the attack near Khor Abeche, Southern Darfur, in which seven peacekeepers from the United Republic of Tanzania and a police officer from Sierra Leone were tragically killed. I am deeply disturbed by the fatal wounding of two national aid workers caught in the crossfire between Government forces and associated militias in Nyala, Southern Darfur. It is extremely regrettable that, to date, no Government investigation into these and previous attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers has resulted in the perpetrators being held to account. I call upon the authorities to fully investigate each of these cases and swiftly bring those responsible to justice. I was also saddened by the death of four UNAMID peacekeepers from Burkina Faso owing to an accident caused by flooding. I would like to express my deepest condolences to the Governments of the United Republic of Tanzania, Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso and to the families, friends and colleagues of the fallen peacekeepers.

85. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and all the women and men of UNAMID who continue to work tirelessly to protect civilians and promote peace. I would like to welcome Joseph Mutaboba, the new Deputy Joint Special Representative, who assumed his duties on 8 July 2013. Lastly, I would like to express my appreciation to the women and men of the humanitarian community who work in often challenging conditions in Darfur to assist and improve the lives of people in need.